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ABSTRACT—In Altera Corp. v. Commissioner, the United States Tax Court 
invalidated a 2003 Treasury Regulation for failing to meet State Farm’s 
reasoned decisionmaking standard under the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA). Invalidating this specific regulation eliminates one of the federal 
government’s latest attempts to limit income tax avoidance by some of the 
world’s largest and wealthiest corporations in the murky world of transfer 
pricing. This Note demonstrates that the Tax Court’s ruling must be limited 
to its specific APA holding and argues that Treasury may enact a similar 
regulation under the existing statutory and regulatory framework of the 
arm’s length standard.  
Under the APA, Treasury must respond to all significant comments 
and provide a reasonable statement of basis and purpose for a new 
regulation. This Note offers viable responses to the public comments 
Treasury (apparently) inadequately addressed and proposes a framework 
for a statement of basis and purpose that would satisfy State Farm’s 
reasoned decisionmaking standard under the APA. These responses 
demonstrate that sharing employee compensation expenses indexed to a 
corporation’s stock price is not comparable between related and unrelated 
parties because they have inherently different risks. Therefore, while 
Treasury failed to respond to comments that provided evidence that 
unrelated parties do not share stock-based compensation, a finding that 
determined the outcome in Altera, it does not follow that requiring 
unrelated parties to share stock-based compensation violates the 
overarching arm’s length standard. Finally, this Note proposes that if 
Treasury can provide evidence that related companies share a smaller 
percentage of total employee compensation relative to unrelated companies 
in similar arrangements, such a regulation is consistent with the arm’s 
length standard. This regulation would be consistent with the standard 
because it creates transaction results that are “consistent with the results 
that would have been realized if uncontrolled taxpayers had engaged in the 
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same transaction,” and achieves the purpose of Internal Revenue Code 
§ 482.
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It has become common for managers to tell their owners to ignore 
certain expense items that are all too real. “Stock based 
compensation” is the most egregious example. The very name says it 
all: “compensation.” If compensation isn’t an expense, what is it? 
—Warren Buffett† 
INTRODUCTION 
Politicians frequently announce an intent to close corporate tax 
loopholes.1 Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton made preventing 
“inversions,” “where businesses move their corporate residence abroad on 
paper in order to escape paying their fair share of taxes,” a bulwark of her 
campaign’s tax policy.2 However, even if this goal was achieved, another 
form of multinational corporate tax avoidance endures—transfer pricing 
manipulation. When multinational companies manipulate transfer pricing, 
they do not seek to move their corporate residence abroad, but rather, they 
seek to move their corporate profits abroad in order to escape paying their 
fair share of taxes. As a conservative estimate, economists believe that 
inappropriate transfer pricing practices allow the United States’ largest 
corporations to avoid over $100 billion annually in tax expense.3 To put 
that number into perspective, U.S. corporations only paid $317 billion in 
taxes in 2014, so almost one-third of all corporate tax collected is lost every 
year due to inappropriate transfer pricing methods.4 Understandably, tax 
scholars believe “transfer pricing has become, and remains, the single most 
important international taxation issue for both tax administrations and 
taxpayers.”5 
Treasury recently failed in its bid to address one particular transfer 
pricing issue in Altera Corp. v. Commissioner.6 Treasury’s loss raises 
† Letter from Warren E. Buffett, Chairman of the Bd., Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to Shareholders, 
Berkshire Hathaway Inc., at 16 (Feb. 27, 2016), http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2015ltr.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A5JP-TK3D]. 




3 STAFF OF S. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 110TH CONG., REP. ON DIVIDEND TAX ABUSE: HOW 
OFFSHORE ENTITIES DODGE TAXES ON U.S. STOCK DIVIDENDS 1 (Comm. Print 2008), 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov//imo/media/doc/091108DividendTaxAbuse.pdf [https://perma.cc/2H26-
R3FA]. 
4 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2014 DATA BOOK, PUBLICATION 55B, at 3 (2014), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/14databk.pdf [https://perma.cc/JLG6-TK78]. 
5 CYM H. LOWELL & PETER L. BRIGER, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING ¶ 1.08, Westlaw 
476826 (database updated 2016). 
6 The government has subsequently filed for appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Notice of Appeal, Altera 
Corp. v. Comm’r, No. 16-70497 (9th Cir. Feb. 19, 2016). Although the outcome could possibly change 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
796 
significant practical issues for the U.S. government by creating a huge gap 
in its ability to tax some of the most profitable U.S.-based companies. In 
Altera, the U.S. Tax Court7 invalidated a 2003 Treasury regulation on 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) grounds for failing to meet State 
Farm’s reasoned decisionmaking standard.8 The Tax Court’s decision 
marked the U.S. government’s third consecutive failed attempt to require 
foreign subsidiaries engaged in a subset of transfer pricing called “cost-
sharing agreements” to reimburse their U.S. parent companies (and thus 
make those U.S. companies subject to tax on reimbursement) for U.S. 
stock-based compensation expenses.9 Just as Warren Buffet is baffled by 
corporate managers’ attempts to convince shareholders that stock-based 
compensation is not an expense,10 Treasury has been baffled by taxpayers’ 
attempts to convince courts that stock-based compensation is not an 
expense companies must share in these agreements.   
Overall, Altera’s reversal significantly reduces the United States’ 
ability to tax companies that devote significant resources to research and 
development (R&D), which include very profitable and very large high-
tech, medical device, and pharmaceutical companies. This is particularly 
impactful because the development of new technology by companies that 
devote significant resources to R&D is one of the United States’ most 
upon appeal, this is unlikely because the Tax Court’s decision was without dissent. Furthermore, the 
substance of this Note stands irrespective of a potential reversal. 
7 The Tax Court is a court of record established by Congress under Article I of the U.S. 
Constitution, and is composed of nineteen presidentially appointed members. About the Court, UNITED 
STATES TAX COURT, https://www.ustaxourt.gov/about.htm [https://perma.cc/7VUX-4ZQA]. After “the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue has determined a tax deficiency, the taxpayer may dispute the 
deficiency in the Tax Court before paying any disputed amount.” Id. Taxpayers may appeal a Tax Court 
decision to the federal circuit court where the taxpayer resides “in the same manner and to the same 
extent as decisions of the federal district courts in civil actions tried without a jury.” BORIS I. BITTKER 
& LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, AND GIFTS ¶ 115.6, Westlaw 
440105 (database updated 2016). 
8 Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 91, 92 (2015), appeal docketed, No. 16-70497 (9th Cir. Feb. 
23, 2016). The Tax Court decision was unanimous because all voting judges signed on to the opinion. 
Id. at 134. 
9 Ajay Gupta, News Analysis: Altera—Third Time’s Not a Charm, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY (Aug. 
3, 2015), LEXIS 2015 WTD 148-1 (citing Treasury’s previous two failed attempts to require companies 
participating in cost-sharing agreements to share stock-based compensation expense). In Seagate 
Technology, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 200-388 (2000), the IRS conceded the issue after the 
taxpayer motion survived summary judgement. Id. In Xilinx Inc. v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 37 (2005), 
as will be discussed in Section II.E, the taxpayer succeeded based on language of 1995 regulations 
addressing this issue. See infra Section II.E. 
10 Letter from Warren E. Buffett, Chairman of the Bd., Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to Shareholders, 
Berkshire Hathaway Inc., at 16 (Feb. 27, 2016), http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2015ltr.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A5JP-TK3D] (“[I]t has become common for managers to tell their owners to ignore 
certain expense items that are all too real. ‘Stock-based compensation’ is the most egregious example. 
The very name says it all: ‘compensation.’ If compensation isn’t an expense, what is it?”). 
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important remaining comparative advantages in the global market,11 and 
thus a valuable source of present and future U.S. tax revenue. The type of 
cost-sharing agreements at issue allowed a foreign subsidiary to reimburse 
a U.S. parent company for its R&D costs, in return for an ownership right 
in the assets developed.12 The reimbursement from the foreign subsidiary is 
taxable income in the United States, and the invalidated regulation required 
stock-based compensation to be one of the costs included in the 
reimbursement calculation. The high-tech industry covets cost-sharing 
agreements, calling them “an indispensable tool for managing global 
intangible property rights.”13 And in a perfect storm, they similarly covet 
the use of stock-based compensation, stating it helps attract and retain 
qualified workers, and thus is a “key engine of growth and innovation in 
the U.S. economy.”14 The frequent use of the two practices by the high-tech 
industry means that the invalidated regulation will significantly reduce the 
U.S. government’s ability to tax these companies. For instance, about 20% 
of Apple Inc.’s $8 billion in R&D expenses from 2015 came from stock-
based compensation.15 Similarly, stock-based compensation made up 
almost 22% percent of Google’s $12 billion 2015 R&D expense.16 Because 
of this invalidated regulation, Google alone realized a $3.5 billion tax 
benefit now that its subsidiaries in these agreements no longer have to 
reimburse for stock-based compensation.17 
Before diving deeper into Altera’s cost-sharing agreement and stock-
based compensation focus, it may be helpful to describe briefly the general 
concept of transfer pricing for those unfamiliar. First, the largest companies 
in the United States are not individual entities. Rather, each “company” is 
11 Frank A. Wolak, Our Comparative Advantage, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/01/18/can-the-us-compete-with-china-on-green-tech/our-
comparative-advantage [https://perma.cc/C8FD-2RLH] (stating the United States has an advantage in 
the production of goods that are human- and physical-capital intensive because of its relative abundance 
of highly educated labor force and technologically sophisticated equipment). 
12  See infra note 39. 
13 Caroline Graves Hurley, American Electronics Association, Letter Re Comments on the 
Proposed Regulations on the Treatment of Employee Stock Options For Qualified Cost Sharing 
Arrangements, TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 28, 2002, at 3. 
14 Id. at 2. 
15 Apple Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 39, 64 (Sept. 26, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/320193/000119312515356351/d17062d10k.htm 
[https://perma.cc/EBZ8-R233] (reporting that of the company’s over $8 billion of research and 
development expense, $1.5 billion was from stock compensation expense). 
16 Alphabet Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 4 (Dec. 31, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000165204416000012/goog10-k2015.htm 
[https://perma.cc/8X6L-REVW] (reporting that of the company’s over $12 billion of research and 
development expense, over $2.5 billion was stock compensation expense). 
17 Id. at 92. 
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actually a group of hundreds of entities, or “boxes”18 ultimately owned at 
the top by one entity, which is usually a public corporation. Practitioners 
call companies within this group related or commonly controlled 
companies.19 These hundreds of boxes constantly transfer goods and 
services between one another. For each of these related party transfers, a 
price must be set—this is known as the “transfer price.” If an inappropriate 
price is set; one box has too much profit, while another box has too little—
and avoids tax. The owner at the top is generally agnostic as to which box 
books profit (or loss) from these internal transactions because, ultimately, it 
owns all of them. Layer on international borders between these boxes—and 
the different tax rates imposed by different countries—and there is huge 
incentive for the box in the lowest tax jurisdiction to book as much group 
profit as possible. The United States is frequently on the losing end of this 
dynamic because the United States has one of the world’s highest corporate 
tax rates,20 while other countries charge a 0% corporate income tax rate.21 
Understanding this dynamic, governments around the world have called for 
an end to abusive profit shifting practices.22  
18 The term boxes is a reference to how the multiple entities are depicted on a corporate 
organizational chart, which lays out the ownership structure for a group of related companies. 
19 Commonly controlled, or related, companies is a term of art in transfer pricing because I.R.C. 
§ 482 applies only if organizations are “owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same
interests.” JAMES S. EUSTICE & THOMAS BRANTLEY, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
& SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 13.20[3][a] (2016) (quoting I.R.C. § 482 (2012)). Commonly, this occurs when
one company owns another company. The term “multinational” indicates that the group includes
companies that are incorporated or otherwise residents of countries outside the United States.
Companies that are not part of the same ownership group are called unrelated companies. Parent
company indicates that one company owns another company. The company owned by a parent
company is referred to as a subsidiary. Parent and subsidiary companies are commonly controlled or
related for purposes of I.R.C. § 482. Id. ¶ 13.20[3][b].
20 KYLE POMERLEAU, TAX FOUND., CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES AROUND THE WORLD 2 
(2014), http://taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.org/files/docs/FF436_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W7Q9-LK82]. 
21 For example, the Cayman Islands has a 0% corporate tax rate. Id. at 4. The Cayman Islands was 
the location of the subsidiary in question in Altera. 145 T.C. 91, 92 (2015), appeal docketed, No. 16-
70497 (9th Cir. Feb. 23, 2016). 
22 LOWELL & BRIGER, supra note 5 ¶ 2.02[22][f][i] (noting that the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) leads this charge, but the United Nations and G-20 have separately 
announced their intention to address the issue). The OECD is an organization of thirty-five member 
countries, and includes Australia, Canada, the United States, Germany, Japan, Korea, Spain, and 
Turkey. See Members and Partners, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners 
[https://perma.cc/92K8-QVJA]. The OECD’s main program to address this issue is its “Base Erosion 
and Profit Shifting” program that seeks to prevent tax planning strategies that “artificially shift profits to 
low or no-tax locations where there is little or no economic activity.” See About BEPS and the Inclusive 
Framework, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-about.htm 
[https://perma.cc/HYX6-QHRA]. 
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FIGURE 1: TRANSFER PRICING 
For the United States, its general method for combatting abusive 
transfer pricing practices is through the single statutory law that governs it, 
Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) §482. Accompanying this statutory law is a 
voluminous set of Treasury regulations promulgated thereunder. The 
regulations, promulgated under I.R.C. §482, require U.S. companies to 
meet the “arm’s length” standard to prevent abusive transfer pricing 
practices. This standard requires that related party transactions be 
consistent with the results of unrelated party transactions.23 However, 
determining the results unrelated parties would reach is exceedingly 
difficult, particularly when determining the price of intangibles.24 
Beginning in the 1930s, and affirmed in regulations in the 1960s, the 
comparable uncontrolled transaction (CUT) method took precedence for 
determining prices for the transfer of tangible products.25 This method 
works well when readily comparable transactions exist, such as when 
homogenous manufactured goods are sold broadly to both unrelated and 
related parties; however, it is much less helpful for unique, innovative 
goods or services, particularly intangible property where readily 
comparable products do not exist.26 Recognizing this, Congress requested 
that Treasury overhaul the existing regulations in the late 1980s. This 
resulted in the 1994 regulations that required taxpayers to use the “best” of 
five potential methods which generates the most “reliable” arm’s length 
23 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b) (2015); see infra Sections II.C–E. 
24 A Study of Intercompany Pricing, I.R.S. Notice 88-123, 1988-2 C.B. 458, 460 [hereinafter 
Whitepaper] (“Because of the absence of comparables in many cases, intangible transfers generally are 
the most problematic of adjustments due to the inherent difficulty of valuing intangibles under the 
existing regulations.”). 
25 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length: A Study in the Evolution of U.S. 
International Taxation, 15 VA. TAX REV. 89, 99, 108 (1995). 
26 See supra note 24. 
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price. Determining which method is “best” requires analyzing the 
comparability of the unrelated and related transactions in at least five 
suggested aspects: risks, functions, contractual terms, economic conditions, 
and property or services.   
The purpose of this Note is to close the hole left by Altera and 
prescribe a method for Treasury to promulgate a regulation that would 
require multinational companies engaged in cost-sharing agreements to 
share at least a portion of stock-based compensation expenses.27 This Note 
will establish that, contrary to what other commentators have suggested, 
Treasury is not limited to adopting “strict” comparable transaction transfer 
pricing regulations.28 In addition, under the existing framework of the arm’s 
length standard, Treasury can pass a new regulation similar to the one 
struck down by Altera.29 To satisfy the requirements of the APA’s notice- 
and-comment rulemaking,30 Treasury must provide detailed responses to 
comments received from the public and demonstrate adequate reasoning in 
a statement of basis and purpose. This Note provides an argument Treasury 
could have put forth to address the major comments that the Tax Court 
ruled Treasury inadequately engaged with when the rule was 
promulgated.31 The proposed response argues that sharing expenses 
indexed to stock performance is incomparable between related and 
unrelated parties because of their different levels of risk,32 and thus is an 
inappropriate basis for making an arm’s length determination.33 Further, 
27 The decision also calls into question whether an unknown number of current regulations are 
invalid because Treasury often has not complied with APA procedures. See Kristin E. Hickman, A 
Problem of Remedy: Responding to Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure 
Act Rulemaking Requirements, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1153, 1154 (2008) (describing a sample study 
that concluded 40% of Treasury regulations passed between 2003 and 2005 failed to follow some 
procedural requirement of the APA). The possible implication or resolution of this issue are beyond the 
scope of this Note. 
28 See Gupta, supra note 9, at 1, 4 (noting that unless the IRS can “persuade Congress to amend the 
statute,” the Treasury cannot likely undo the “result in Altera by simply going through another notice 
and comment process”). 
29 Id. 
30 See infra Section I.B. 
31 The most damaging comments received provided evidence that unrelated parties in similar cost-
sharing agreements never shared stock-based compensation expenses. The taxpayer then argued that 
requiring related parties to share an expense unrelated parties never shared violated transfer pricing’s 
arm’s length standard. Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 91 (2015), appeal docketed, No. 16-70497 
(9th Cir. Feb. 23, 2016). 
32 Related companies under common control can use basic management techniques to affect their 
own stock price, so they have a level of control over stock compensation expenses that reduces risk to 
price fluctuations that unrelated companies simply will never have, and cannot replace. See infra 
Section III.D. 
33 One commentator suggested that when related parties “incur costs that by their nature wouldn’t 
be shared,” the arm’s length result may have to be hypothesized to determine an arm’s length price. See 
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Treasury can demonstrate adequate basis for this regulation if Treasury can 
provide evidence that related companies share a smaller percentage of total 
employee compensation than unrelated companies do in similar 
arrangements. The purpose of such a regulation would be to eliminate this 
difference. Eliminating this difference achieves two things: (1) it creates 
results that are “consistent with the results that would have been realized if 
uncontrolled taxpayers had engaged in the same transaction,”34 as required 
by the arm’s length standard and (2) it prevents the “evasion of income 
taxes” as required by the statutory language of I.R.C. § 482.  
This Note proceeds as follows: Part I will describe background 
information regarding transfer pricing, the APA, Treasury’s related 
rulemaking authority, and the Altera case. Part II will describe the 
historical and current construction of the arm’s length standard, including 
how the Tax Court applied the arm’s length standard in a similar case that 
preceded Altera, Xilinx.35 Part III will dispose of the misconception that the 
arm’s length standard is either statutorily required to adhere to a strict 
comparable method, or that Treasury lacks the authority to redefine arm’s 
length. The conclusion of Part III is helpful to this Note’s ultimate 
argument because the 1994 regulation’s new definition of the arm’s length 
standard focuses on the results unrelated taxpayers would reach, and thus 
allows Treasury to select total employee compensation as the basis for 
comparison between related and unrelated parties, rather than stock-based 
compensation itself. Finally, Part IV provides responses to the comments 
the Tax Court held in Altera were inadequately addressed. Part IV also 
proposes a general argument to satisfy State Farm’s reasoned 
decisionmaking standard under the APA to promulgate a new regulation 
that requires related parties that participate in cost-sharing agreements to 
share at least a portion of stock-based compensation. 
I. BACKGROUND: TRANSFER PRICING, THE APA, AND ALTERA
This Part will provide background information that at first blush may
seem unrelated, but is necessary to understand the holding of Altera. First, 
Richard W. Skillman, The Problems with Altera, 150.3 TAX NOTES 347, 351 (2016) (“When commonly 
controlled parties incur costs that by their nature wouldn’t be shared by unrelated parties, there are no 
truly comparable cost-sharing transactions between unrelated parties [and] in the absence of unrelated 
party comparables, the arm’s-length standard may have to be applied . . . by hypothesizing the result of 
that arm’s-length dealing.”). 
34 6 C.F.R. § 1.482-1(b) (2015). This Note proposes that this disparity likely exists because of the 
differing incentives of the two parties in regards to how to compensate employees that participate in 
cost-sharing agreements. See example in Section I.A. 
35 Xilinx, Inc. v. Comm’r (Xilinx I), 125 T.C. 37 (2005), rev’d, 567 F.3d 482, 497 (9th Cir. 2009), 
aff’d, 598 F.3d 1191, 1197 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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this Section I.A will provide additional information regarding transfer 
pricing as briefly referenced in the Introduction, and an overview of the 
specific cost-sharing agreements at issue in Altera that fall within the 
general umbrella category of transfer pricing. Next, Section I.B will 
provide background information on the APA. Finally, Section I.C will 
describe Treasury’s related rulemaking authority, and the standards 
Treasury must meet in order to pass regulations that have the force of law.  
A. Transfer Pricing and Cost-Sharing Agreements
In order to understand the fundamentals of transfer pricing, consider 
the following example. Related parties are agnostic as to which one books a 
profit because the same shareholders own all of the group’s earnings. If one 
party, A, is incorporated in a high-tax jurisdiction and owns B, which is 
incorporated in a low-tax jurisdiction, the group of companies would want 
B to earn all their profit because it would reduce total tax owed. In this 
example, A and B, which are related parties, want to sell goods or services 
to C. A makes widgets that cost $100 to produce, and they can sell to C for 
$200, resulting in a $100 profit. That $100 profit is normally taxed at 40% 
and thus would leave shareholders with $60 after-tax profit. But if A 
decides to sell its widgets to B for $105, it would leave A with a profit of 
$5, and after applying a 40% tax rate A would have $3 after-tax profit. B 
could then sell to C for $200, which, after subtracting their $105 cost to 
purchase from A, leaves them with a $95 profit. B is taxed at 0% and so B 
earns an after-tax profit of $95. Therefore, in this scenario total after-tax 
profit for the group is $95 plus $3, or $98. So simply by placing B in a low-
tax jurisdiction, and having them sell to an unrelated party C, the 
shareholders of A and B have increased after-tax profit by $38, or 63%.  
This seems dramatic, but this can happen in transfer pricing if there 
are not clear rules to stop this type of manipulation. The 40% tax rate A 
normally pays is similar to the tax rate of the United States, and there are 
tax haven countries that do not charge any corporate income tax at all, 
similar to B’s country.36 A would never sell to an unrelated, uncontrolled 
party for such a low price though, and therefore the United States Tax 
Code, under § 482, grants the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue 
Service (Treasury) the right to reallocate income between related parties.37 
Treasury has published hundreds of pages of regulations in an attempt to 
36 See supra note 20–21. 
37 I.R.C. § 482 (2012). 
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provide structure as to when it will make these allocations among related 
parties.38  
Now let us take the prior example a step further, and look at how 
transfer pricing interacts with cost-sharing agreements. Recall that the cost-
sharing agreements allow a foreign subsidiary (or domestic subsidiary) to 
reimburse a U.S. parent company for the R&D costs it incurred in return 
for an ownership right in the assets developed.39 The reimbursement from 
the foreign subsidiary is taxable income in the United States. For related 
parties in cost-sharing agreements, every dollar of employee compensation 
in the form of stock-based compensation, instead of other forms of 
employee compensation, provides a fantastic tax benefit. The company gets 
a deduction for the stock compensation that reduces its taxable income,40 
and it is not required to receive a payment from its foreign subsidiary, 
which also reduces its taxable income.  
Consider the following simplified example. U.S. parent company 
(USP) and its subsidiary enter a cost-sharing agreement where foreign 
subsidiary (FS) pays USP for USP’s expenses to develop new software, 
and in return FS owns half the rights to the software.41 USP’s only expense 
is a single employee who is paid a $200,000 salary. Under a cost-sharing 
agreement where FS owns half the software, FS would have to pay USP 
half the employee salary, $100,000. The entire $100,000 payment would be 
taxable income in the United States. However, if USP restructures the 
employee’s compensation to be half salary and half stock-based 
compensation, USP would still deduct the entire $200,000 and FS would 
only have to reimburse USP for $50,000. Thus, by shifting employee salary 
to stock compensation, USP has cut its taxable income in half. On the other 
hand, unrelated parties do not have this same incentive because they prefer 
$1.00 of expense reimbursement over the possible $0.40 tax benefit from 
38 Reallocations consist of a primary adjustment wherein the IRS may allocate items of income, 
deductions, credits, or any item affecting taxable income by increasing or decreasing the amount 
attributed to any related party member. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(2) (2015). Using the example above, 
this could require A to recognize $100 profit for its sale to B because that is the price that C, an 
unrelated party, was willing to pay for it. 
39 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(a)(1). The above is a simplified explanation. Specifically, Treasury 
Regulation § 1.482-7(a)(1) requires participants to share “intangible development costs” in proportion 
to their “reasonably anticipated benefits” from the agreement. Simply put, if the foreign subsidiary has 
the right to half of the projected future income of an intangible asset being developed in a cost-sharing 
agreement, they have to contribute half the cost to develop it. Id. 
40 See infra note 170. 
41 This is a simplified example. Specifically, in Treasury Regulation 1.482-7, companies in cost-
sharing agreements must share “intangible development costs” in proportion to their “reasonably 
anticipated benefits” of the agreement. See supra note 39. 
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forgoing reimbursement.42 In fact, unrelated parties have an incentive to 
keep employees paid as much as possible by salary in order to ensure their 
unrelated partner is paying as much of the expense as possible. Therefore, 
without clear transfer pricing rules to require related parties engaged in 
cost-sharing agreements to share stock-based compensation, they can 
drastically reduce their taxable income in a manner that is inconsistent with 
the results unrelated parties would reach.  
B. The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946
Next, to understand why the regulation was invalidated in Altera, it is 
necessary to understand the basics of the APA. The administration of our 
modern federal government requires Congress to write federal statutes and 
other branches of government to interpret them.43 When administrative 
agencies like Treasury interpret federal statutes, they issue nonlegislative 
interpretive rules that do not have the force of law but may be provided 
deference by courts.44 At times, Congress goes a step further and delegates 
legal authority to administrative agencies, and allows them to issue 
legislative rules, which have the force of law and are binding on courts, 
citizens, and the agency.45 The APA governs all administrative agency 
rulemaking processes.46  
Under § 553 of the APA, there are three procedures for issuing a 
rule.47 First, agencies may promulgate interpretive rules that are not binding 
on courts by issuing and publishing the rule in the Federal Register—
without following any APA procedure.48 By contrast, substantive 
42 Reducing the amount reimbursed by unrelated parties is a dollar-for-dollar loss. Although this 
also reduces taxable income for the unrelated party, they only receive a benefit proportionate to the 
applicable tax rate on that foregone reimbursement. Thus, at a tax rate of 40%, for each $1.00 not 
reimbursed, a related company loses $0.60. 
43 Ellen P. Aprill, The Interpretive Voice, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2081, 2081 (2005) (“Under current 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, sometimes courts assume primary interpretative authority; at other times, 
that task falls to the executive branch in the form of an administrative agency.”). 
44 Id. at 2082 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 
(1984)) (noting that under Chevron’s two-step analysis, if a “‘statute is silent or ambiguous,’ . . . courts 
[should] defer to the agency so long as ‘the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of 
the statute’”). 
45 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 408, 419, 471 (5th ed. 2010); see 
Peter L. Strauss, Comment, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1464 (1992). 
46 The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2012). 
47 PIERCE, supra note 45, at 557. 
48 PIERCE, supra note 45, at 474. See infra Section I.C for discussion as to how the Treasury 
previously asserted that all of its regulations are interpretative rather than legislative. 
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legislative rules, except for those specifically exempt,49 require following 
one of two procedures.50  
The two procedural avenues for issuing legislative rules are formal 
and informal rulemaking.51 The most important and interesting procedure is 
informal rulemaking—known colloquially as “notice-and-comment 
rulemaking,” because formal rulemaking has become increasingly rare.52 
Notice-and-comment rulemaking requires: (1) issuing public notice of the 
proposed rule; (2) receiving and considering comments from all interested 
persons; and (3) issuing the final rule, which includes stating the agency’s 
basis and purpose.53 As stated above, an agency that passes a rule following 
the notice-and-comment procedure can create an instrument with the force 
of law that binds courts, citizens, and the government itself.54 However, the 
APA compels courts to determine whether a legislative rule is valid and 
“set aside [an] agency action” that is “arbitrary” or “capricious.”55 
Whether adequate notice has been issued may be a contentious issue;56 
however, the most common basis for judicial reversal comes when a court 
determines an agency did not provide an adequate “statement of basis and 
purpose.”57 The Supreme Court has ruled a statement of basis and purpose 
is adequate if it finds evidence of “reasoned decisionmaking.”58 The 
application of the reasoned decisionmaking standard follows the statutory 
requirements of § 553, and thus there must be evidence of the agency’s 
reasoned decisionmaking in response to comments it received.59 Similarly, 
49 Section 553(a) exempts from all APA procedures (1) military and foreign affair rules and (2) 
agency management rules. § 553(a). Section 553(b) specifically exempts from notice-and-comment 
procedures (1) “interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, 
procedure, or practice” and (2) “when the agency for good cause finds . . . that notice and public 
procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.” Id. § 553(b). 
50 As opposed to purely procedural rules which are exempt under § 553(b)(A). PIERCE, supra note 
45, at 557. 
51 Id. at 557–58. 
52 Id. at 558. 
53 § 553(c); see also PIERCE, supra note 45, at 557. 
54 Strauss, supra note 45, at 1466–67. 
55 § 706(2)(A); PIERCE, supra note 45, at 559. 
56 PIERCE, supra note 45, at 572 (explaining that challenges to this requirement generally come 
when: (1) a large divergence existed between the proposed action and the agency final action such that 
an affected party had no notice of a critical element of the final action and (2) the agency relied on data 
not known until it announced its final action). 
57 Id. at 593. 
58 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 52 
(1983); PIERCE, supra note 45, at 600. 
59 PIERCE, supra note 45, at 594, 600. 
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there must be evidence of reasoned decisionmakring in the agency’s 
statement of basis and purpose.60 
First, reasoned decisionmaking requires proportionately detailed 
responses to comments received from interested persons during the notice-
and-comment period.61 For instance, if a comment criticizes a characteristic 
of the proposed rule, but the agency retains that characteristic without a 
relatively detailed response to the criticism, a reviewing court will likely 
find the rule unlawful.62 Next, the agency must demonstrate adequate 
reasoning in its statement of basis and purpose for the rule, or put another 
way, it must identify the source of legislative authority for the rule and why 
the rule is necessary.63 Thus, this statement of basis and purpose 
encompasses two aspects. First, “[h]ow well has the agency anchored the 
rule in the language of the statute it purports to implement?” Second, if the 
agency’s reasoning depends on a pattern of facts, “how well has the agency 
supported its belief in the existence of that pattern of facts?”64  
In State Farm, the Supreme Court defined whether an agency meets 
the reasoned decisionmaking standard as follows:  
[A]n agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has [1] relied
on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, [2] entirely failed to
consider an important aspect of the problem, [3] offered an explanation for its
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or [4] is so
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product
of agency expertise.65
State Farm stated and applied the Court’s reasoned decisionmaking 
standard in a way that seems to impose only a “modest burden of 
explanation.”66 However, this standard is more difficult for an agency that 
wants to issue a major rule because its statement of basis and purpose must 
include all statutory factors considered in the decision, every important 
aspect of the problem, and responses to all counterevidence that typically 
comes from interested parties’ criticisms during the comment period.67 In 
fact, some agencies have concluded that it would take them a decade to 
60 Id. 




65 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983). 
66 PIERCE, supra note 45, at 599. 
67 Id. at 600. 
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issue a major rule, which critics suggest deters agency rulemaking due to 
the significant staff resources and time required.68  
C. Treasury’s Rulemaking Authority
In an average year, Treasury promulgates hundreds of rules under the 
I.R.C.69 Treasury contends the majority of its regulations are interpretative,
and thus nonlegislative, making them exempt from the APA notice-and-
comment requirements.70 If so, the majority of Treasury regulations would
not hold the force of law. This is significant because agency rules that do
not hold the force of law will not be granted Chevron deference71 by courts
as ruled in Mead.72 However, even if they are not granted the more
generous Chevron deference, agency interpretative rules are still afforded
limited deference under Skidmore.73 Even with the reduced deference
courts may afford its regulations, Treasury likely prefers courts to treat its
rules as interpretative because it allows the agency to avoid the huge
resource expenditure that true notice-and-comment rulemaking
implicates.74
68 Id. at 601. 
69 See Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack of) 
Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1727, 1741 (2007); see also Hickman, A Problem of Remedy, supra note 27, at 1154. 
70 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 32.1.1.2.6.1 (Sept. 23, 2011), https://www.irs.gov/
irm/part32/irm_32-001-001.html#d0e470 [https://perma.cc/Y7L8-VGAW] (“The Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) exempts interpretative rules from the APA’s notice and comment 
requirements. . . . Most IRS/Treasury regulations are considered interpretative.”); see also Hickman, 
Coloring Outside the Lines, supra note 69, at 1729 (stating Treasury contends its regulations are exempt 
from notice and comment because they are interpretative in character). 
71 The Chevron deference standard requires a two-step inquiry where the court must first ask if the 
statutory meaning is facially clear from the statute, and if so, the court “must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). But if the congressional statute is not clear, the court is to defer to an 
agency’s reasonable interpretation. Id. (defining a reasonable decision as one that “is based on a 
permissible construction”). 
72 United States v. Mead Corp., 53 U.S. 218, 226 (“We hold that administrative implementation of 
a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated 
authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency 
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”). 
73 Id. at 227–28. Skidmore deference is described as proportional to the agency position’s power to 
persuade. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (discussing how the weight afforded 
to agency interpretations depends on “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its 
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it 
power to persuade”). 
74 This is particularly true in the case of transfer pricing regulations, which are promulgated under 
the extremely sparse I.R.C. § 482, and provide almost no direct rules. 
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But one scholar recently contended—and the Tax Court in Altera 
ruled—that the broad authority granted under I.R.C. § 7805(a) to the 
Secretary of Treasury to “prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the 
enforcement of” the I.R.C. means such rules are legislative in nature, and 
therefore must comply with APA notice-and-comment procedures.75 While 
this could be a disastrous outcome for Treasury,76 the problem is not 
entirely dire because Treasury has generally complied with notice-and-
comment procedures despite contending its regulations were exempt.77 As a 
result, some compliant Treasury regulations arguably have received a bump 
in authority. However, the greater risk is that potentially hundreds of 
regulations are invalid for sloppy compliance with APA procedure, and a 
plausible opportunity exists for “unhappy taxpayers to challenge [such] 
regulations . . . for their procedural failings.”78  
II. ALTERA AND THE ARM’S LENGTH STANDARD
A. Altera Overview
In Altera, the Tax Court invalidated Treasury Regulation § 1.482-
7(d)(2).79 The court held the regulation was a legislative rule, and then 
found it arbitrary and capricious and therefore invalid under the APA.80 The 
court held that Treasury failed to satisfy State Farm’s reasoned 
decisionmaking standard in the agency’s final statement of the regulation’s 
basis and purpose.81 Specifically, the court found that the regulation’s “final 
rule lack[ed] a basis in fact,” failed to connect with evidence found, failed 
to respond to significant comments, and was contrary to the evidence 
before it.82  
75 Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 91, 116–17 (2015), appeal docketed, No. 16-70497 (9th Cir. 
Feb. 23, 2016) (quoting I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2012)); Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines, supra note 69, 
at 1763–64. 
76 Hickman, supra note 27, at 1154 & n.4. Despite prior voluntary notice-and-comment procedures, 
a recent study concluded 40% of Treasury regulations passed from 2003 to 2005 failed to follow some 
procedural requirement of the APA. Id. 
77 Id. at 1158. 
78 Id. at 1154. 
79 Altera, 145 T.C. at 133; Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(d)(2) (2015). 
80 Altera, 145 T.C. at 133. See supra note 70 for a discussion about whether all Treasury rules are 
legislative and thus subject to the APA. 
81 Although the court lists four reasons, in essence, they all relate to the Treasury’s failure to 
respond to comments because those comments introduced evidence that the rule “failed to rationally 
connect . . . with the facts.” Altera, 145 T.C. at 133. 
82 Id. 
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Altera is a multinational group of commonly controlled (i.e., related) 
companies83 that develop high-tech devices and sell the related hardware 
and software.84 The case resulted from the IRS’s adjustment to U.S. parent 
company’s85 (Altera U.S.) taxable income for approximately $80 million.86 
The IRS asserted the U.S. parent company should have been paid more by 
a company it owned87 that was located in the Cayman Islands, Altera 
International (Altera Cayman). In technical terms, the two companies 
entered a cost-sharing agreement wherein Altera Cayman and Altera U.S. 
agreed to “pool resources” to further develop IP previously created by 
Altera U.S.88 In conjunction with the cost-sharing agreement, Altera 
Cayman had also licensed the right to exploit the IP previously created by 
Altera US in all markets except the U.S. and Canada.89 These cost-sharing 
agreements, by definition, allowed Altera Cayman to also exploit the newly 
developed IP subject to the cost-sharing agreement without having to make 
separate royalty payments to Altera U.S.90 While this may seem 
complicated, simply put, Altera Cayman agreed to pay Altera U.S.: 1) 
royalties for the rights to IP previously developed by U.S.; and 2) costs to 
further develop that IP, in return for ownership-type rights in the newly 
developed IP. From a high-level perspective this amounts to the Altera 
multinational group migrating ownership of their IP from a U.S. company 
(Altera U.S.) to a Cayman Islands company (Altera Cayman).  
This brings us to the major question at issue in this case: which was 
whether Altera U.S. must be reimbursed for stock compensation paid to 
U.S. employees that perform R&D in connection with the cost-sharing 
83 See supra note 19 for the definition of controlled, or related, companies. 
84 Altera, 145 T.C. at 93. 
85 Parent company indicates a company that owns another company. The company owned by a 
parent company is referred to as a subsidiary. Parent and subsidiary companies are commonly 
controlled or related for purposes of I.R.C. § 482 (2012). 
86 Altera, 145 T.C. at 94. 
87 Also referred to as a related party, a controlled company, or a subsidiary company. 
88 Intangible assets in this case were related to intellectual property such as patent, copyright, and 
trade secrets developed during research and development. Altera, 145 T.C. at 93–94. 
89 Id. at 93. 
90 Treasury Regulation § 1.482-7(a)(1) requires participants to share “intangible development 
costs” in proportion to their “reasonably anticipated benefits” from the agreement. So, if the foreign 
subsidiary has the right to half of the projected future income of an intangible asset being developed in 
a cost-sharing agreement, they have to contribute half the cost to develop it. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
7(a)(1). Furthermore, each participant must receive a “non-overlapping interest in the cost shared 
intangible without further obligation to compensate another controlled participant for such interest.” See 
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(b)(4)(i). And each participant shall be “entitled to the perpetual and exclusive 
right to the profits from transactions . . . to the extent such profits are attributable to such interest in the 
cost shared intangibles.” Id. 
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agreement.91 Specifically, § 1.482-7(d)(2) required Altera Cayman to 
reimburse Altera U.S. for all employee compensation, including stock 
compensation, paid to employees that worked to make the intangible 
assets,92 but Altera did not include those employee’s stock compensation 
expenses.93 Altera disputed that the Cayman company should pay a portion 
of Altera U.S.’s employee stock-based compensation on grounds that the 
rule itself was invalid since Treasury failed to respond to significant 
comments under the APA during their rulemaking procedures.94  
When Treasury was promulgating this rule, they received comments 
from interested parties, and the most significant issue raised by the 
comments included evidence that unrelated parties under similar 
agreements had never agreed to share stock-based compensation costs.95 
This is significant, because per § 1.482-1(b), transactions between related 
parties meet the arm’s length standard if the results are consistent with 
results that would have been realized by uncontrolled parties to 
“comparable transactions under comparable circumstances.”96 As the court 
stated here, the evidence provided by commentators that unrelated parties 
did not share stock compensation cost was evidence that a rule requiring 
related parties to do so is inconsistent with the arm’s length standard 
articulated in Treasury Regulation § 1.482-1(b).97 As the court stated, this 
possible inconsistency was never adequately addressed and the final 
statement of basis and purpose Treasury offered was a bare “ipse dixit”98 
statement that “[p]arties dealing at arm’s length in such an arrangement . . . 
would not distinguish between stock-based compensation and other forms 
of compensation.”99 Indeed, the court’s characterization seems correct 
because Treasury’s statement does not coincide with the evidence 
commentators provided, and Treasury offered no other support. In fact, the 
evidence commentators provided directly contradicts Treasury’s statement 
because it showed that unrelated parties had specifically distinguished 
91 Altera, 145 T.C. at 91. 
92 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(d)(2) (2015). 
93 Altera, 145 T.C. at 93. 
94 Id. at 120. 
95 Id. at 127–30. The court also recognized an additional minor argument by economic professors 
that “there is no net economic cost to a corporation or its shareholders from the issuance of stock-based 
compensation.” Id. at 129. 
96 § 1.482-1(b)(1). 
97  Altera, 145 T.C. at 133–34; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (“[T]he standard to be applied 
in every case is that of a taxpayer dealing at arm’s length with an uncontrolled taxpayer.”). See supra 
note 83 for a definition of controlled parties. 
98 Altera, 145 T.C. at 133. 
99 Id. at 109. 
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stock-based compensation from other compensation since that was the only 
type they had not shared. Therefore, the court correctly concluded that the 
regulation was invalid because it “lack[ed] a basis in fact,” failed to 
connect with evidence found, failed to respond to significant comments, 
and was contrary to the evidence before it.100  
Treasury’s reasoning that sharing stock-based compensation costs was 
consistent with the overarching arm’s length standard may have failed in 
this instance, but the real question is: Could Treasury have made an 
alternative argument that satisfied State Farm’s reasoned decisionmaking 
standard? The preceding Section outlined the court’s reasoning in Altera. 
This provides the foundation of this Note’s prescriptive claim as to how 
Treasury can promulgate a regulation similar to the one stuck down. Recall 
that State Farm requires an agency to exercise reasoned decisionmaking in 
both its responses to comments and in its general statement of the 
regulation’s basis and purpose. First, the major criticism that unrelated 
parties do not share stock-based compensation costs does not indicate the 
regulation violates the arm’s length standard. While this may have been a 
more difficult comment to respond to under the “strict” comparable 
construction of the arm’s length standard, the broader understanding of 
arm’s length implemented by the 1994 regulations provides the necessary 
support. Under the 1994 regulations, one of the primary considerations for 
satisfying the arm’s length standard requires looking at the comparability 
of the unrelated and related party transactions. In regards to stock 
compensation, whether unrelated parties share these costs is not 
comparable because unrelated and related parties have fundamentally 
different levels of risk and uncertainty; unrelated parties have no ability to 
manage the other party’s stock price, while related parties have the ability 
to manage their own stock price. Moreover, the broader arm’s length 
standard implemented by the 1994 regulations requires the results of 
related party transactions to be consistent with unrelated party transactions, 
not the method. These two characteristics of the 1994 regulations’ arm’s 
length standard provide the detail necessary to satisfy State Farm, the first 
hurdle of the APA, and thus lawfully address the comments received. In 
order to further develop this concept, the following Section defines the 
arm’s length standard’s historical and current legislative construction.  
B. The Evolving Arm’s Length Standard
The arm’s length standard is a concept that was first introduced in 
1935 by Treasury to provide guidance to taxpayers as to when it will adjust 
100 Id. at 133. 
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a taxpayer’s taxable income under I.R.C. § 482.101 The meaning of the 
arm’s length standard has been a contentious issue for most of its eighty-
year history.102 At its inception, courts considered it a broad concept 
focused on whether an allocation was necessary “to reflect . . . income.”103 
However, beginning in the early 1960s, courts began to narrowly construe 
the arm’s length standard and only focus on finding comparable 
transactions (strict comparable method)104 between uncontrolled parties to 
support or contradict a finding that the taxpayer has met the standard.105  
In 1986, Congress recognized that the blind focus on strict comparable 
transactions was an issue and asked Treasury to review the current 
practices for potential changes.106 This led to the issuance of new 
regulations in 1994. These new regulations sought to supersede 
unfavorable court decisions and replace the strict comparable transaction 
approach with a results-driven approach.107 Per the best method rule, the 
method used must be the one that “provides the most reliable measure of an 
arm’s length result.”108 Thus, the best method rule emphasizes a results-
driven approach and requires taxpayers to determine which of the now-
101 LOWELL & BRIGER, supra note 5, ¶ 2.02[8]. 
102 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 25. This article traces the history of the arm’s length standard and 
asserts that the original interpretation was a broad construction that focused on a “clear reflection of 
income” of a taxpayer. Id. at 98 (quoting Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Comm’r, 31 B.T.A. 1152, 1159 
(1932)). Then the interpretation became unduly narrowed by the courts in the 1960s and strictly focused 
on the existence of a comparable uncontrolled transaction until prompted by Congress in 1986 to revise, 
when it was broadened to indicate a “transfer pricing continuum” that uses multiple methods other than 
strict comparable transactions to reach “results . . . the same as those that would have been reached 
between unrelated parties.” Id. at 94. 
103 See, e.g., Nat’l Sec. Corp. v. Comm’r, 137 F.2d 600, 602 (3d Cir. 1943) (inquiring whether 
allocation was necessary “in order clearly to reflect the income”). In Seminole Flavor Co. v. 
Commissioner, the Tax Court held for the taxpayer and stated the arm’s length determination of a 
transaction is determined by whether it was “fair and reasonable.” 4 T.C. 1215, 1232–33 (1945). In fact, 
the court seemed to rebuff whether a comparable transaction existed to support an arm’s length 
determination and stated “[w]hether any such business agreement would have been entered into by 
petitioner with total strangers is wholly problematical.” Id. at 1233. 
104 This interpretation will be referred to as “strict comparable” throughout this Note. 
105 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 25, at 116 (first citing U.S. Steel Corp. v. Comm’r, 617 F.2d 942, 
950–51 (2d Cir. 1980) (admitting that the transactions were fundamentally different but still holding 
them as comparable); and then quoting id. (“To say that Pittsburgh Steel was buying a service from 
Navios with one set of expectations about duration and risk, and [U.S.] Steel another, may be to 
recognize economic reality; but it is also to engraft a crippling degree of economic sophistication onto a 
broadly drawn statute.”)). 
106 H.R. REP. NO. 99-841, pt. 2, at 638 (1986) (Conf. Rep.) (noting that “conferees are also aware 
that many important and difficult issues under section 482 are left unresolved” and inviting the Treasury 
to study intercompany pricing rules and consider whether existing regulations could be modified). 
107 LOWELL & BRIGER, supra note 5, ¶ 1.02. 
108 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 25, at 145 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c)(1) (2015)). 
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available five methods a taxpayer should use to determine an arm’s length 
price.109  
The following Section will outline each of these five alternatives. 
These alternatives are relevant because they represent Treasury’s broader 
interpretation of the arm’s length standard.  
C. The Five Arm’s Length Standard Methods
The 1994 regulations introduced the concept of the best method rule, 
which defined the allowable methods for determining an arm’s length 
transfer price and made it clear that strictly relying on comparable 
transactions was a thing of the past.110 Because of the 1994 regulations, it is 
best to understand the arm’s length method as an umbrella term under 
which strict comparables is one possible method. The first three of the five 
possible methods are often referred to as “traditional” methods because 
they more strictly rely on comparable transactions for the basis of their 
price.111   
First, the “comparable uncontrolled price” method relies on pricing 
from two unrelated parties selling the same specific product.112 Next, there 
is the “cost plus” method, where a normal profit margin of uncontrolled 
parties in a similar industry is determined and then applied to the costs of 
the controlled party to determine the appropriate price.113 Similar to “cost 
plus” is the “resale price,” which also determines an appropriate profit 
margin, but applies to a seller rather than a manufacturer.114 The traditional 
methods work well in the manufacturing world, where many producers 
provide the same products to customers.115 However, they have little use in 
the high-tech development world, i.e., the space occupied by Altera, where 
unique products and services do not have readily available comparables.116  
The last two methods were introduced by the 1994 regulations, and 
one loosely relies on an outside comparable, and the other is almost entirely 
internally derived. The “comparable profits” method uses an industry 
average profit for a broad group of corporations in a similar industry, and 
109 Id. at 145–46. 
110 LOWELL & BRIGER, supra note 5, ¶ 1.02. 
111 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 25, at 91–92. 
112 Id. at 92. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 H.R. REP. NO. 99-426, at 423–26 (1985) (Conf. Rep.). 
116 Id. (“Many observers have questioned the effectiveness of the ‘arm’s length’ approach of the 
regulations under section 482” where “[t]he problems are particularly acute in the case of . . . high-
profit potential intangibles.”). 
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then applies it to the cost of the controlled company in question.117 Finally, 
the “profit split” method signals Treasury’s willingness to almost 
completely depart from using comparable transactions to determine an 
arm’s length price. The profit split method first analyzes the functions 
performed by each related party, then a market rate of return for each 
function is determined based on loose comparables, and finally, remaining 
residual profit is divided between the parties using a fairly flexible 
formula.118 As a result of these disparate methods—particularly the 
introduction of the profit split method—it is clear the arm’s length standard 
as defined in the 1994 regulations (and existing currently) does not require 
the existence of a specific uncontrolled comparable to support an 
adjustment made by Treasury.  
D. Determining the Best Method by Degree of Comparability
The best method rule requires a taxpayer to use whichever among the
five available methods “provides the most reliable measure of an arm’s 
length result.”119 A taxpayer determines the reliability of a method by 
analyzing (1) the degree of comparability between controlled and 
uncontrolled transactions and (2) the quality of data and assumptions 
used.120  
The comparability of transactions requires a taxpayer to assess the 
following factors: (1) functions, (2) contractual terms, (3) risk, (4) 
economic conditions, and (5) property or service.121 The standard of 
comparability does not require identical transactions, but only that 
transactions “must be sufficiently similar that it provides a reliable measure 
of an arm’s length result.”122 Taxpayers are further required to generally 
adjust the results for any difference in comparability, if possible,123 and the 
adjustments “must be based on commercial practices, economic principles, 
and statistical analyses.”124 The IRS must determine the best method and 
comparability standards before a court can approve or deny the basis for an 
adjustment.125  
117 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 25, at 93. 
118 Id. at 93–94. 
119 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c)(1) (2015). 
120 Id. § 1.482-1(c)(2)(i). 
121 Id. § 1.482-1(d)(1). 
122 Id. § 1.482-1(d)(2). 
123 It is possible to use the result even if adjustments cannot be made, but it reduces reliability. Id. 
§ 1.482-1(d)(2).
124 Id.
125 The Tax Court opinion in Altera omits this analysis, for good reason, because the substance of 
the adjustment was not at issue, but rather whether the rule passed was valid to support the issue. 
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Section II.B described the history of the arm’s length standard and 
clarified its current construction. Moreover, to satisfy the APA, the 
Treasury must provide detailed responses to all comments received. For the 
regulation struck down in Altera, the most significant criticism was that 
stock-based compensation should not be shared by related parties because 
Treasury did not provide evidence of unrelated parties sharing the same 
expenses. However, the broadened 1994 regulations’ construction of the 
arm’s length standard does not blindly rely on “strict” comparable 
transactions. Further, the primary factor for determining whether a 
particular unrelated transaction should be used to determine conformity 
with the arm’s length standard is how comparable it is. As this Note will 
discuss in Part IV, sharing stock compensation between unrelated and 
related parties is not comparable due to the different levels of risk each 
party would assume. Finally, because the current construction of the arm’s 
length standard focuses on the results of related party transactions rather 
than the method, total employee compensation may be used as the relevant 
point of comparison for an arm’s length method to determine the expenses 
that should be shared. Therefore, if Treasury provides evidence that related 
parties compensate employees using stock compensation at a higher rate 
than unrelated parties, then not requiring related parties to share stock 
compensation would create a result inconsistent with the total employee 
compensation shared by related parties and thus violate the arm’s length 
standard. The next Section describes a case that decided an issue almost 
identical to Altera, but was decided before the invalidated regulation was 
enacted. This case provides important background to the substance of the 
issue and the feasibility of reviving a related regulation not discussed in 
depth in Altera, because Altera was decided on procedural grounds, i.e., 
Treasury failed to satisfy the APA in its rulemaking procedure.  
E. Xilinx v. Commissioner
In March 2010, the IRS battled with a taxpayer in a case almost 
identical to Altera where the IRS alleged a foreign subsidiary must pay for 
stock compensation expenses. However, in this case, the years adjusted 
were from 1996 through 1999, and therefore, the 2003 regulations that 
specifically required sharing stock compensation expenses were not at 
issue. The only question the court needed to answer was whether requiring 
the sharing of stock compensation expenses was consistent with the arm’s 
length standard.  
In an odd series of events, the Tax Court first ruled in the taxpayer’s 
favor that the costs were not required to be shared, then the Ninth Circuit 
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issued an opinion reversing the holding of the Tax Court.126 However, the 
Ninth Circuit subsequently withdrew that holding eight months later and 
affirmed the original opinion of the Tax Court.127 Under Treasury 
Regulation § 1.482-7(d) at that time, parties to an agreement were only 
required to share compensation paid to the group’s R&D employees, and 
there was no specific mention of stock compensation expenses.128 The 
taxpayer’s experts provided evidence that no unrelated party had shared 
stock-based compensation expenses, and the court held that on its face, 
Treasury Regulation § 1.482-1, which requires all adjustments to be made 
on an arm’s length basis, denied the IRS the ability to reallocate stock 
compensation expenses because there was no evidence that unrelated 
(uncontrolled) parties had ever shared them before.129  
Although the court eventually agreed with the taxpayer, it is important 
to note two things. First, the court based its decision on statutory law in 
effect from 1996 to 1999 that did not include the updated regulation that 
required sharing stock compensation.130 Next, the government’s argument 
on this issue relied on the second sentence of § 482 to support the 
allocation.131 However, this is problematic because the second sentence of 
§ 482—known as the commensurate with income standard—has always
been interpreted by Treasury as “consistent[] with the arm’s length
standard.”132 The government failed to provide a convincing argument as to
how the allocation is consistent with the arm’s length standard.133 Because
the government asserted only the commensurate with income standard as
the basis for the allocation, the taxpayer’s rebuttal that there was no
evidence of unrelated parties sharing these costs was particularly damaging
because the lack of evidence seems inconsistent with a “strict” comparable
arm’s length standard. However, unlike the government in Xilinx, this Note
will argue in the following Part that requiring these costs to be shared is
consistent with the arm’s length standard despite the evidence from
126 Xilinx I, 125 T.C. 37, 62–63 (2005), rev’d, 567 F.3d 482, 497 (9th Cir. 2009). 
127 Xilinx, Inc. v. Comm’r (Xilinx II), 567 F.3d 482, 496–97 (9th Cir. 2009), withdrawn, 592 F.3d 
1017 (9th Cir. 2010); Xilinx, Inc. v. Comm’r, 598 F.3d 1191, 1197 (9th Cir. 2010); aff’g Xilinx I, 
125 T.C. 37 (2005). 
128 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(d)(1) (as amended in 1999); I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. 2000-03-010 (Oct. 
18, 1999) (requiring that cost-sharing agreement participants share option-related expenses as well). 
129 Xilinx I, 125 T.C. at 61. 
130 Id. at 50. 
131 Brief of Respondent at 86–87, Xilinx I, 125 T.C. 37 (2005) (No. 4142-01) (the government 
relying upon an assertion that the commensurate with income standard added after the 1986 revision to 
§ 482 supports its position because the relative economic activities undertaken by the parties are
consistent with the allocation).
132 See I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. AM-2007-007, at 1 (Mar. 23, 2007). 
133 Xilinx I, 125 T.C. at 59. 
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unrelated parties. The following Part will demonstrate that sharing stock 
compensation has a fundamentally different level of risk, and therefore, 
whether unrelated parties share this specific type of employee 
compensation is irrelevant to the arm’s length standard because the two 
circumstances are not comparable.134   
III. REVIVING THE REGULATION
As mentioned, there is a misconception that the Altera decision 
requires any new transfer pricing regulations to adhere to a strict 
comparable arm’s length method.135 However, new transfer pricing 
regulations, like the 2003 regulation invalidated in Altera, do not require a 
strict comparable method to meet an arm’s length standard under the 
current definition of § 1.482-1(b), which was revised by the 1994 
regulations.  
A. Unrelated Taxpayers Evidence Not Determinative of Arm’s Length
As demonstrated in Part II, the arm’s length standard is a construct of
Treasury’s own legislative rules,136 rather than statutory authority.137 
Therefore, Treasury has the ability to amend any of its rules as long as it 
follows appropriate notice-and-comment procedures.138 However, as long 
as Treasury Regulation § 1.482-1(b)(1) (201) in its current form is on the 
books, Treasury must adhere to the current definition of the arm’s length 
standard in passing new transfer pricing regulations because the regulation 
states that the arm’s length standard is “to be applied in every case.”139 And 
because it is a legislative rule, the government is similarly bound.140 The 
134 See infra Part III. 
135 See Gupta, supra note 9 (noting that unless the IRS can “persuade Congress to amend the 
statute,” the Treasury cannot likely “undo the result in Altera by simply going through another notice 
and comment process”). 
136 See supra Section II.D. 
137 Some may argue that the existence of arm’s length standard language in treaties with foreign 
countries complicates this analysis. Specifically, in Altera, there is no treaty between the United States 
and the Cayman Islands, and thus does not apply in this case. More broadly, most treaties do not 
attempt to define arm’s length themselves but rather refer to incorporating the principle “reflected in the 
U.S. domestic transfer pricing provisions.” DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF 
THE CONVENTION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE 
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND FOR THE 
AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION AND THE PREVENTION OF FISCAL EVASION WITH RESPECT TO 
TAXES ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL GAINS, art. 9, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/treaties/Documents/teus-uk.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9R2-Z66A]. Therefore, treaties themselves 
incorporate the Treasury definition of arm’s length. 
138 See supra text accompanying notes 45, 53–54. 
139 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (2015). 
140 Id. 
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last time § 1.482-1(b) was amended in 1994, Treasury introduced the best 
method rule with the addition of the phrase: “Evaluation of whether a 
controlled transaction produces an arm’s length result is made pursuant to a 
method selected under the best method rule described in § 1.482-1(c).”141 
Therefore, under the 1994 regulations the best method rule applies to 
determine whether a transaction produces an arm’s length result, and does 
not require blind reliance on transaction data between unrelated parties. As 
discussed above, to determine the best method, a taxpayer must determine 
how comparable potential transactions are in regard to five factors: (1) 
functions, (2) contractual terms, (3) risk, (4) economic conditions, and (5) 
property or service.142 The existing best method standard requires the 
comparability of transactions, and if potential comparable transactions are 
not actually comparable, then taxpayers should not use them to evaluate 
whether the transaction produces an arm’s length result.143 Therefore, there 
is no need to change the definition of arm’s length in order to require 
sharing stock compensation in circumstances similar to Altera because the 
existing standard is already flexible enough to accommodate such a rule. 
As discussed in Part II, after the 1994 regulations, arm’s length is best 
understood as an umbrella standard under which the strict comparable 
transaction analysis is one of five qualifying methods.144 The current 
legislative rule defines the arm’s length standard as requiring the result of a 
transaction between controlled taxpayers to be consistent with results 
uncontrolled taxpayers would achieve under the same circumstances.145 The 
standard further recognizes that identical transactions are rarely available, 
and while it acknowledges an arm’s length result will generally be 
determined by reference to comparable transactions under comparable 
circumstances, it by no means requires the basis of an arm’s length method 
to be a comparable transaction.146 Given the rule requires that arm’s length 
be determined by reference to uncontrolled taxpayers under the same 
circumstances, but only generally by reference to uncontrolled taxpayers 
under comparable circumstances, it stands to reason that diverging from 
reference to uncontrolled taxpayers may occur when there are not 
sufficiently comparable circumstances.  
141 Id. 
142 Id. § 1.482-1(d). 
143 See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text. 
144 See supra Sections II.D–E. 
145 § 1.482-1(b)(1). 
146 Id. 
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In fact, Congress’s purpose for amending I.R.C. § 482147 and urging 
Treasury to amend the definition of arm’s length was to end the strict 
reliance on unrelated party transactions when circumstances are not 
sufficiently comparable.148 Treasury complied with this mandate by 
redefining the arm’s length standard as discussed above, introducing 
“nontraditional” pricing methods, and amending the best method rule to 
allow taxpayers to select from the five possible options to evaluate whether 
a transaction has an arm’s length result.149 Therefore, transfer pricing 
regulations are not required to adhere to strict comparables to meet the 
arm’s length standard in order to satisfy the State Farm reasoned 
decisionmaking standard under the APA. 
One possible counterargument may be that the arm’s length standard 
requires adherence to strict comparable transactions because Notice 88-123 
(commonly referred to as the “White Paper”), which Treasury issued in 
1988, included an endorsement of the arm’s length standard as embodied in 
U.S. tax treaties and major model treaties.150 The first flaw in this argument 
is that it contradicts the plain language of § 1.482-1(b). The revised 
§ 1.482-1(b) added a qualification for when to use unrelated party
transactions as the basis for the arm’s length method. In addition, the
revision included a related statement that unrelated party transactions
should generally be used under comparable circumstances, which makes it
clear that the standard need not be exclusively reliant on unrelated party
transactions.151 Further, as Professor Reuven S. Avi-Yonah has
demonstrated, the legislative history of the 1994 amendment also supports
a departure from the strict comparable arm’s length approach.152 The arm’s
length standard as understood in 1988 was replaced in the United States
and elsewhere with a different type of arm’s length standard that requires a
broader, more flexible method for determining how to allocate profits
between related entities.153 Avi-Yonah suggests that the 1988 White Paper
147 H.R. REP. NO. 99-426, at 423–26 (1985) (Conf. Rep.) (“Many observers have questioned the 
effectiveness of the ‘arm’s length’ approach of the regulations under section 482. A recurrent problem 
is the absence of comparable arm’s length transactions between unrelated parties . . . .”). 
148 See supra note 106. 
149 See discussion of best methods, supra Section II.E. 
150 I.R.S. Notice 88-123, 1988-2 C.B. 458, 475. 
151 Treasury Regulation § 1.482-1(b) was unchanged from 1988 until the 1994 amendment. Before 
the 1994 amendment, the regulation simply read, “the standard to be applied in every case is that of a 
taxpayer dealing at arm’s length with an uncontrolled taxpayer.” Treas. Reg. § 1. 482-1(b) (1988); 
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b) (1993). 
152 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 25, at 91. 
153 Id. 
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itself caused the demise of the traditional154 arm’s length standard.155 
According to this theory, the 1988 White Paper caused this demise by first 
introducing alternative arm’s length methods that departed from reliance on 
unrelated party transactions.156 The proposed regulations in 1992, and 
ultimately the 1994 amended regulation, similarly included alternatives that 
deviated from reliance on unrelated party transactions, specifically a form 
of the comparable profits method.157 Therefore, both the plain meaning of 
§ 1.482-1(b) and its legislative history demonstrate that the arm’s length
standard does not require adherence to strict comparable transactions.
The conclusion of this Section is helpful to this Note’s ultimate 
conclusion because understanding that Treasury broadened the meaning of 
arm’s length with the 1994 regulations allows Treasury to select total 
employee compensation as the basis for comparison between related and 
unrelated parties, rather than narrowly focusing on stock-based 
compensation itself. The following Section proposes that the more flexible 
arm’s length standard, under its current construction, allows Treasury to 
promulgate new regulations to require related parties that participate in 
cost-sharing agreements to share at least a portion of stock-based 
compensation. These proposed new regulations would satisfy State Farm’s 
reasoned decisionmaking standard under the APA by first proposing a 
response to the comments provided in Altera, and then proposing a 
statement of basis and purpose with adequate reasoning. The proposed 
response to the comments in Altera argues that sharing expenses indexed to 
stock performance is incomparable between related and unrelated parties 
due to their different levels of risk,158 and thus is inappropriate to use as a 
basis for making an arm’s length determination.159 Next, Treasury can 
154 What Avi-Yonah has referred to as the traditional arm’s length standard, I have referred to as 
the strict comparable arm’s length method throughout this Note. 
155 Avi-Yonah, supra note 25, at 91. 
156 Id. at 135 (“[T]he true message of the White Paper was that the traditional [arm’s length 
standard] could not be applied to the majority of section 482 cases because no comparables could be 
found. What the White Paper instead achieved was to substitute an expanded definition of the [arm’s 
length standard] for the traditional one: [arm’s length standard] was now understood to include . . . the 
rest of the transfer pricing continuum, up to and including profit split, as long as the results reached 
were compatible with arm’s length results.”). 
157 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1T(b)(2)(iii)(C) (as amended in 1994); see Avi-Yonah, supra note 25, at 
144; supra Section II.D. 
158 Related companies under common control can use basic management techniques to affect their 
own stock prices, so they have a level of control over stock compensation expenses that reduces risk to 
price fluctuations that unrelated companies simply will never have and cannot replace. See infra Section 
III.D.
159 One commentator suggested that when related parties incur costs that by their nature would not
be shared, the arm’s length result may have to be hypothesized to determine an arm’s length price. 
Skillman, supra note 28, at 351 (“When commonly controlled parties incur costs that by their nature 
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demonstrate adequate reasoning in a statement of basis and purpose for this 
regulation if it can provide evidence that related companies share a smaller 
percentage of total employee compensation than unrelated companies in 
similar arrangements. The basis and purpose of such a regulation would be 
to eliminate this difference. Eliminating this difference achieves two 
things: (1) it creates results that are “consistent with the results that would 
have been realized if uncontrolled taxpayers had engaged in the same 
transaction,”160 as required by the arm’s length standard, and (2) it prevents 
the “evasion of [income] taxes” as required by the statutory language of 
I.R.C. § 482.
B. Satisfying the APA
As discussed in Part II, the APA essentially places two separate 
demands on an agency implementing a legislative rule apart from the 
administrative requirement of issuing pubic notice.161 First, the APA 
requires proportionately detailed responses to comments received from 
interested persons during the notice-and-comment period.162 For instance, if 
a comment criticizes a proposed rule, or the factual predicate for a 
proposed rule, but the agency retains that characteristic or factual predicate 
without a relatively detailed response to the criticism, a “reviewing court is 
likely to hold the rule unlawful.”163 Next, the agency must demonstrate 
adequate reasoning in their statement of basis and purpose.164 This 
adequacy of reasoning statement also encompasses two aspects. First, 
“[h]ow well has the agency anchored the rule in the [statutory language] it 
purports to implement?” Second, if the agency’s reasoning depends on a 
pattern of facts existing, “how well has the agency supported its belief in 
the existence of that pattern of facts?”165  
Under this standard, the following Section describes how Treasury 
could reenact legislation that requires sharing stock compensation in cost-
sharing agreements that would satisfy the APA and the controlling State 
Farm reasoned decisionmaking standard. First, Treasury would have to 
wouldn’t be shared by unrelated parties, there are no truly comparable cost-sharing transactions 
between unrelated parties,” and “in the “absence of unrelated party comparables, the arm’s-length 
standard may have to be applied . . . by hypothesizing the result of that arm’s-length dealing.”). 
160 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (2015). This Note proposes that this disparity likely exists given the 
differing incentives of the two parties in regards to how to compensate employees that participate in 
cost-sharing agreements. See example, supra Section I.A. 
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respond to the two major comments received, which contend: (1) there is 
no evidence of unrelated taxpayers ever sharing stock-based compensation; 
and (2) stock-based compensation has no economic cost to issuing 
corporations, so sharing these costs is superfluous. Next, Treasury must 
adequately reason its statement of basis and purpose to: (1) anchor the rule 
in the statutory language of § 482 it purports to implement and (2) support 
its belief in the existence of that pattern of facts with evidence that 
unrelated companies in cost-sharing agreements disproportionately use 
stock-based compensation as a percentage of total employee 
compensation.166  
C. Responses to Comments
Treasury could provide adequate responses to the comments received 
as follows. First, although there is no evidence unrelated parties share 
stock-based compensation, the arm’s length standard does not require strict 
comparable methods.167 Treasury can pass a regulation that is consistent 
with the arm’s length standard that does not use strict comparables if the 
transaction is not reasonably comparable. In regards to stock compensation 
expense, unrelated companies who do not share these expenses are not 
reasonably comparable to related parties because the two have 
fundamentally different levels of risk related to these expenses. The two 
situations have fundamentally different levels of risk because one unrelated 
company cannot influence the stock price of another unrelated company, 
but a company can influence their own stock price. This difference turns a 
portion of the risk profile of stock compensation expense for unrelated 
parties from an endogenous risk168 into an exogenous risk—a source of risk 
that it has no control over because it is completely external to the 
company.169 Also, since the same set of interested shareholders control 
related companies, the internal ability to control stock price and the 
derivative stock compensation expense remains within the group, and thus 
is still endogenous rather than exogenous. Similarly, there are two flaws 
with comments from economists suggesting that stock compensation has no 
economic effect on issuing corporations. First, stock-based compensation is 
a deductible tax expense, so at a minimum, this reduction in tax expense 
166 See supra Section II.B. 
167 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1T(b) (1994); see supra Section III.D. 
168 Jason Shogren, Endogenous Risk and Protection Premiums, 31 THEORY & DECISION 241, 241 
(1991) (explaining that endogenous risk arises from sources of risk that result from the companies’ own 
decisions and so the companies have a significant degree of control over them). 
169 Ronald E. Shrieves & Drew Dahl, The Relationship Between Risk and Capital in Commercial 
Banks, 16 J. BANKING & FIN. 439, 446–47 (1992). 
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has that economic effect on the issuing company.170 Second, Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)171 state that stock compensation 
expenses have economic effects per the 2006 revised GAAP standards, 
which require that companies deduct stock compensation expenses as an 
operating expense similar to any other form of employee compensation.172 
The remainder of this Section will look at each of these proposed responses 
in greater detail. 
Sharing stock-based compensation between related and unrelated 
parties is not comparable because there are multiple ways that a company 
can affect its own stock price, but there is no meaningful way for a 
company to affect the stock price of an unrelated company.173 First, as an 
overview, the cost a company must expense or deduct for all stock 
compensation is directly dependent upon the issuing corporation’s stock 
value for financial statement purposes under GAAP and for income tax 
purposes of stock-based compensation.174 Although it can take several 
iterations, stock-based compensation is often in the form of stock options, 
which grant the holder the right to buy stock at a future date at a 
predetermined price, or restricted stock units, which grant an employee the 
right to a stock or its cash equivalence after the vesting date.175 One 
comment that Treasury failed to respond to in Altera is an apt 
characterization of how unrelated parties consider the risk related to 
sharing another company’s stock compensation expense. Comments from 
American Electronics Association (AeA) and others stated, “unrelated 
parties would not agree to share or reimburse amounts related to stock-
based compensation because the value of stock-based compensation is 
170 N. La Var Harline, Maximizing Employee After-Tax Wealth for Stock Options and Restricted 
Stock, 18 J. DEFERRED COMPENSATION 49, 55 (2013). 
171 GAAP is the set of accounting standards the Securities and Exchange Commission requires all 
publicly traded companies to follow. 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-01 (2016). GAAP is promulgated by an 
independent, private-sector, non-profit organization called the Financial Accounting Standards Board. 
FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ABOUT THE FASB, http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/
Page/SectionPage&cid=1176154526495 [https://perma.cc/J2RN-WLXZ]. 
172 FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO.
123: SHARE BASED PAYMENT i (2004), http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document_C/
DocumentPage?cid=1218220124271&acceptedDisclaimer=true [https://perma.cc/63G3-7NKD] (noting 
that failing to deduct stock-based compensation as an operating expense “do[es] not faithfully represent 
the economic transactions affecting the issuer, namely, the receipt and consumption of employee 
services in exchange for equity instruments”). 
173 Shrieves & Dahl, supra note 169, at 446–47. 
174 Harline, supra note 170, at 53, 55–56. 
175 Id. at 50–55. 
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speculative, potentially large, and completely outside the control of the 
parties.”176 
However, for related companies, this risk is much less because one set 
of stockholders is in ultimate control. Within this group of related 
companies is substantial endogenous control over the group’s stock price 
through simple management practices. The owners of a company have the 
ability to appoint managers (which may include themselves) who have the 
unique ability to affect their own stock price. A company can create 
shareholder value and thus increase its stock price in the long term through 
effective management of the corporation.177 These management techniques 
focus on making decisions and acquisitions that maximize expected value 
at the expense of lowering near-term earnings.178 They also include prudent 
balance sheet management, returning cash to shareholders in absence of 
lucrative investment opportunities, rewarding executives for delivering 
long-term returns, and providing investors with prudent information 
disclosures.179 Indeed, academic literature demonstrates well-established 
findings that periodic corporate earnings directly impact stock returns and 
stock price of a corporation.180   
But even more importantly, companies can make a wide range of 
short-term decisions that can have immediate impact on stock price by 
massaging earnings reported, known as “earnings management.” These 
earnings management techniques are common because company managers 
are under tremendous pressure to meet or beat market expectations.181 In 
fact, studies demonstrate that due to the importance assigned to meeting 
earnings expectations, managers become “active players who try to win the 
game by altering reported earnings.”182 A firm can increase reported 
earnings by “accelerating the receipt of revenues, deferring expenses or 
through accounting procedure manipulations.”183 Firms may also make 
economic decisions that can affect short-term earnings such as instituting 
176 See Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 91, 101 (2015), appeal docketed, No. 16-70497 (9th Cir. 
Feb. 23, 2016). 
177 Alfred Rappaport, 10 Ways to Create Shareholder Value, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 2006, at 68. 
178 Id. at 69. 
179 Id. at 71–76. 
180 Eli Bartov et al., The Rewards to Meeting or Beating Earning Expectations, 33 J. ACCT. &
ECON. 173, 174 (2002) (stating this well-established finding was first documented in 1968). 
181 Id. at 173 (stating meeting or beating analysts’ market forecasts is well-entrenched in corporate 
culture). 
182 Id. 
183 Merle Erickson & Shiing-wu Wang, Earnings Management by Acquiring Firms in Stock for 
Stock Mergers, 27 J. ACCT. & ECON. 149, 150 (1999). 
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layoffs, selling assets,184 engaging in stock repurchases,185 offering short-
term price discounts, overproducing goods to reduce cost of goods sold, 
and aggressively reducing discretionary spending such as R&D.186 In fact, 
empirical studies demonstrate that before a stock-for-stock merger, 
companies manage earnings upward to reduce the amount of stock an 
acquisition requires.187 In addition, empirical studies demonstrate that 
companies also manage earnings downward to reduce stock price in 
anticipation of large stock-option grants to CEOs in order to increase their 
own personal return.188 As a result, it is clear that companies can 
endogenously exert tremendous influence over their own stock prices. This 
ability is completely nonexistent for unrelated parties because companies 
do not have any control over the management of an unrelated company and 
thus cannot implement any of the techniques cited. Not only that, but the 
fact a company controls its own stock price introduces a new risk for an 
unrelated party in a potential cost-sharing agreement. This in itself is a new 
major source of exogenous risk because either unrelated party could at any 
moment undertake any one of the multiple ways companies manage short-
term earnings, which would directly affect the amount of stock 
compensation expense the other party is liable for.  
Finally, companies can control the expense and volatility of stock 
compensation by setting the terms of their options or stock grants. The 
most important terms that a company decides relate to vesting and maturity 
which determine the volatility of option expenses.189 Vesting determines 
when an employee can exercise an option, and maturity describes when an 
option expires.190 One could imagine a company awarding options with an 
immediate vesting date and one-day maturity that offers little to none of the 
potential expense volatility referenced by AeA in Altera.191 A potential 
184 Id. at 150. 
185 Paul Hribar et al., Stock Repurchases as an Earnings Management Device, 41 J. ACCT. & ECON.
3, 4 (2006) (stating their study demonstrates that some firms use repurchases to compensate for earnings 
shortfalls). 
186 Sugata Roychowdhury, Earnings Management Through Real Activities Manipulation, 42 J.
ACCT. & ECON. 335, 336 (2006) (stating companies manage earnings by adjusting operational activities 
in ways that deviate from normal business practices; specifically, that companies “avoid[] losses by 
offering price discounts to temporarily increase sales, engage in overproduction to lower cost of goods 
sold, and reduce discretionary expenditures aggressively to improve margins”). 
187 Id. at 174. 
188 Mary Lea McAnally et al., Executive Stock Options, Missed Earnings Targets, and Earnings 
Management, 83 ACCT. REV. 185, 212 (2008). 
189 Pamela Brandes et al., Effective Employee Stock Option Design: Reconciling Stakeholder, 
Strategic, and Motivational Factors, 17 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 77, 86 (2003). 
190 Id. 
191 See supra text accompanying note 176. 
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counterargument is that for a grant with that small of a vesting and maturity 
window to have value, it would most likely need to be granted with a per-
share exercise price less than fair market value and would thus be subject to 
penalty tax under § 409A of the I.R.C.192 Although this is true, a company 
can circumvent potential § 409A penalties if a company issues restricted 
stock or restricted stock units rather than stock options.193 Therefore, it is 
clear that related companies can endogenously manage the relative risk and 
volatility of stock option expense by managing the types and terms 
awarded, while an unrelated company would be unable to manage such 
stock option risk of an unrelated company.  
Critics may argue unrelated companies would not always have 
additional stock option expense risk because they could contractually agree 
not to manage earnings or the terms of the stock compensation such as 
terms, exercise price, etc. However, just because companies could go 
through additional steps to mitigate these risks does not establish that the 
instances are comparable. First, because companies would have to 
negotiate these additional terms, an inevitable difference between related 
and unrelated companies is that unrelated companies would have to give up 
a degree of flexibility. For example, as discussed, there are a multitude of 
short-term economic decisions for managing a company’s stock price such 
as instituting layoffs, selling assets, engaging in stock repurchases, offering 
short-term price discounts, overproducing goods to reduce cost of goods 
sold, and aggressively reducing discretionary spending such as R&D. The 
need to make a change in any one of these areas often has legitimate 
business reasons, and a company would not want to lose this ability. 
Finally, even if companies were agreeable to such contract terms, at a 
minimum they would include high monitoring costs to ensure the other 
party was compliant with the agreement and are arguably undesirable for 
that reason alone. Therefore, unrelated companies could not simply 
contract around the differences between unrelated and related companies 
sharing stock compensation expenses. 
Another potential counterargument could be made that related 
companies do not enjoy the same ability to influence stock price in the 
manner a company can influence its own stock price because the 
companies are separate entities with separate boards of directors that can 
192 Section 409A Creates Important Stock Option Issues, TAX DEP’T: BENEFITS & COMP. UPDATE 
(Latham & Watkins), Jan. 2005, https://www.lw.com/upload/pubcontent/_pdf/pub1161_1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L4HL-2SY2]. 
193 Stock Rights Under Final Section 409A Regulations, WSGR ALERT (Wilson Sonsini Goodrich 
& Rosati), Apr. 19, 2007, https://www.wsgr.com/WSGR/Display.aspx?SectionName=publications/
pdfsearch/clientalert_409astockrights.htm [https://perma.cc/YP9U-GGAZ]. 
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appoint separate management teams. Indeed, it is possible some related 
companies truly separate management, and the parent company does not 
dominate the management of the subsidiary. However, the subsidiary 
management can always affect the stock price of a parent company by 
affecting its own value, which is a component of the parent company’s total 
value. Furthermore, there is nothing besides the threat of piercing the 
corporate veil to prevent a parent company from dominating the 
management of a subsidiary, and thus there is vast potential for abuse. Such 
abuse stems from the fact that the board of directors of the parent company 
has the right to appoint the board of directors of the subsidiary, and nothing 
prevents it from appointing its own members. Therefore, even if some 
related parties cannot influence the stock price of the parent company, there 
remains the potential that the same individuals manage these companies, 
and at a minimum, they are still controlled by the same shareholders.  
Finally, the other comment provided by AeA—arguing that stock-
based compensation has no economic effect on issuing corporations—has 
two major flaws. First, stock-based compensation is a deductible tax 
expense, so at a minimum, this reduction in tax expense must have some 
economic effect on the issuing company.194 Second, GAAP states that stock 
compensation expense has economic effect per the 2006 revised GAAP 
standards, which require companies to deduct stock-based compensation as 
an operating expense similar to any other form of employee 
compensation.195 Thus, the tax benefit at a minimum creates an economic 
impact to the company allowed to take the deduction, and additionally, 
GAAP clearly states these expenses have economic impact similar to other 
compensation expenses.196 For the reasons stated above, these responses, if 
made by Treasury to the major comments, could have satisfied the second 
prong of the APA requirements.  
D. Statement of Basis and Purpose
In addition to responding to comments, Treasury must also adequately 
reason the basis and purpose for such a legislative rule.197 As such, 
Treasury must: (1) anchor the rule in the statutory language of § 482 and 
(2) support its belief that a pattern of facts exists to justify the rule.198 Since
194 Harline, supra note 170, at 55. 
195 See supra note 172. 
196 See supra note 172. Warren Buffett also clearly agrees that stock-based compensation is an 
expense with an economic impact. See supra note 10. 
197 PIERCE, supra note 45, at 594. 
198 Id. 
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the rule is promulgated under I.R.C. § 482,199 the purpose of the regulation 
should be anchored in the statutory language “clearly to reflect . . . income” 
and to “prevent [the] evasion of income taxes.”200 Additionally, the 
regulation must satisfy the arm’s length standard under § 1.482-1(b), as all 
transfer pricing regulations are currently bound by this overarching 
definition.201  
As discussed previously, the arm’s length standard does not strictly 
require using comparable transactions.202 However, the standard does 
require the “results of [a] transaction” to be “consistent with the results that 
would have been realized if uncontrolled [unrelated] taxpayers had engaged 
in the same transaction.”203 Although uncontrolled taxpayers do not share 
stock compensation expense, it is possible the results of related party 
transactions are inconsistent with unrelated parties if related parties use 
stock-based compensation as a greater proportion of total employee 
compensation.  
Next, Treasury would have to anchor the proposed rule in the statutory 
language of § 482. To do so, the economic reality for related parties in 
cost-sharing agreements must be considered. For related parties, every 
dollar of employee compensation in the form of stock-based compensation 
that replaces other forms of employee compensation provides a fantastic 
tax benefit. The company gets a deduction for the stock compensation, 
which reduces its taxable income, and it is not required to receive a 
payment from its foreign subsidiary, which also reduces its taxable 
199 See Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Holding Treasury to Its Word: Altera and Capricious Regulations, 
149 TAX NOTES 519, 522 (2015), for a discussion of how the second sentence of § 482, the 
“commensurate with income standard,” could arguably support requiring related parties to share stock 
compensation expenses. Id. (arguing respondent should have better developed an alternate argument 
“based on the commensurate with income standard”). This Note alternatively argues that the first 
sentence of § 482 provides all the support necessary when using the broadened arm’s length standard 
under the 1994 regulations. This argument is preferred because satisfying the arm’s length standard 
would likely be required under Cummings’ approach as well, because the Treasury has “longstanding 
authoritative interpretation set forth in the regulations and other published guidance . . . that the 
commensurate with income standard must be applied consistently with the arm’s length standard.” 
I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. AM-2007-007, at 1 (Mar. 23, 2007).
200 I.R.C. § 482 (2012); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a) (2015) (“The purpose of section 482 is to
ensure that taxpayers clearly reflect income attributable to controlled transactions and to prevent the
avoidance of taxes with respect to such transactions.”). 
201 Cummings, supra note 199, at 522 (stating that the clear reflection of an income standard “has
long been interpreted to require controlled parties to deal as would unrelated persons dealing at arm’s
length” (citing Comm’r v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A., 405 U.S. 394 (1972))); see also Avi-Yonah,
supra note 25, at 97 (tracing the arm’s length standard to the “true net income” standard discussed in
the 1935 regulations). 
202 See supra Section III.A. 
203 § 1.482-1(b). 
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income.204 Thus, a bright-line rule to exclude sharing stock compensation 
from cost-sharing agreements likely encourages related parties to substitute 
stock compensation for other forms of compensation. If Treasury can 
demonstrate that related companies in cost-sharing agreements pay a 
greater percentage of total employee compensation as stock-based 
compensation, it can establish that the results are not arm’s length, because 
they are not “consistent with the results that would have been realized if 
uncontrolled [unrelated] taxpayers had engaged in the same transaction.”205 
Treasury would argue that sharing these expenses is required to achieve the 
purpose of § 482, in order to prevent the evasion of income taxes by clearly 
reflecting the income of the taxpayer and produce an arm’s length result.206 
This argument likely principally satisfies the reasoned decisionmaking 
standard under the APA to anchor the rule in the statutory language of 
§ 482.
In addition, Treasury would also have to support its belief that a 
pattern of facts exists to justify the new regulation. The evidence needed by 
Treasury to support its belief would likely be easy to produce. Treasury 
would just have to identify and categorize two groups that participate in 
cost-sharing agreements, related and unrelated companies. Treasury then 
would compute the average percent of total employee compensation 
unrelated companies pay by salary versus the average percent of total 
employee compensation related companies pay by salary. As described 
above, it is probable that related companies pay employees who participate 
in cost-sharing agreements with a greater percentage of stock compensation 
due to the one-sided accounting for the transaction, i.e., a U.S. company 
recognizes a deduction without having to recognize any related income 
while the foreign subsidiary’s ownership percentage in the asset is 
unchanged. Evidence that related companies are using stock-compensation 
as a greater percentage of total employee compensation would demonstrate 
that related companies are sharing less total employee compensation than 
unrelated companies.  
For example, on average unrelated parties in cost-sharing agreements 
may spend $100,000 in total employee compensation, wherein $95,000 is 
salary and $5,000 is stock compensation, and thus share 95% of total 
employee compensation. On the other hand, related companies may spend 
$100,000 in total employee compensation, but $50,000 is salary and 
$50,000 is stock compensation, and thus only share 50% of total employee 
204 See supra Section I.A. 
205 § 1.482-1(b). 
206 I.R.C. § 482 (2012); see Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a). 
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compensation. Because related companies in this example pay employees 
with 45% more stock compensation, they are sharing 45% less total 
employee compensation than unrelated companies.   
One could argue that it would be inappropriate to compare the 
percentage of employee compensation paid by salary between related and 
unrelated companies because the same difference this Note highlighted 
previously makes the two unreasonably comparable. However, the 
unreasonable comparison is limited only to stock compensation. That same 
fundamental difference does not apply to whether the percentage of total 
employee compensation paid as salary is comparable. The amount of salary 
paid by controlled and uncontrolled parties has the exact same level of risk, 
and therefore it is an appropriate dimension to compare.   
Another argument could likely be made that Treasury could never 
meet the reasoned decisionmaking standard because the Court already ruled 
in Xilinx, based on the 1994 regulations, that sharing stock compensation 
does not meet the basic arm’s length standard in § 1.482-1(b). However, 
this argument has two flaws. First, in Xilinx, the government never argued 
that the evidence offered—that uncontrolled taxpayers had never shared 
stock compensation—was not sufficiently comparable to be used as the 
basis to determine an arm’s length result.207  
Second, a court’s analysis of whether an agency exercised reasoned 
decisionmaking involves a higher level of deference than the court’s 
determination of whether the Commissioner’s adjustment was 
reasonable.208 Under the State Farm standard, courts only invalidate a rule 
for being arbitrary or capricious. This standard is defined as follows: 
[A]n agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has [1] relied
on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, [2] entirely failed to
consider an important aspect of the problem, [3] offered an explanation for its
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or [4] is so
207 See Memorandum Brief in Support of Respondent’s Notice of Objection to Petitioner’s 
Supplement to Partial Summary Judgment Motion with Respect to the Stock Option Issue at 85–86, 
Xilinx I, 125 T.C. 37 (2005) (No. 4142-01), 2002 WL 34234097, at *85–86. 
208 Ach v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 114 (1964), aff’d, 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1965), defines the 
standard of review for transfer pricing adjustments as allowing the court to review for adjustments that 
are “unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.” Facially this may not seem to be a lower burden, but as 
commentators have described, in practice, courts assign a much lower standard. See LOWELL & BRIGER, 
supra note 5, ¶ 3.14[2], 1999 WL 257449 (2016) (“[T]his burden has been carried in a sufficiently 
frequent manner to suggest that the reality is not as daunting for the taxpayer as the mere statement of 
the standards would indicate.”). 
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implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product 
of agency expertise.209  
The first two instances would not apply to the issue at hand. Congress 
has intended for Treasury to consider whether certain transfer pricing 
practices serve as a basis for a taxpayer to avoid income taxes, such as 
substituting salary expense for stock-based compensation in order to reduce 
payments from their foreign subsidiary. Furthermore, in Altera there was 
no implication that Treasury did not consider an aspect of the problem. The 
third instance may apply, but is easily dismissible. After establishing that 
related parties sharing (or not sharing) stock compensation is not 
comparable because of the vastly different risk between related and 
unrelated parties, the evidence provided would no longer be relevant.210 In 
addition, in order for Treasury to reenact such a rule, this Note assumes that 
they will be able to provide evidence211 that controlled parties provide a 
lower percentage of total employee compensation as salary expense vis-à-
vis uncontrolled parties. This evidence would support Treasury’s position 
that requiring uncontrolled parties to share stock compensation costs is 
consistent with an arm’s length result.212 Finally, the fourth instance 
similarly is dismissible. If Treasury can demonstrate that unrelated parties 
compensate their employees using a greater rate of stock compensation 
than unrelated parties, requiring related companies to share these costs is at 
minimum a difference in view. Therefore, even though the court held in 
Xilinx that sharing stock compensation costs is inconsistent with the arm’s 
length standard, it is by no means certain that a future court would strike 
down as arbitrary or capricious a regulation requiring at least a portion of 
these expenses to be shared.  
Therefore, Treasury has the ability to reenact a stock compensation 
sharing regulation under the existing definition of the arm’s length 
standard. First, the arm’s length standard does not require a strict 
comparable method when appropriate comparables do not exist. Next, 
sharing stock-based compensation is not comparable between related and 
unrelated parties because there is a fundamental difference between the 
significant control a related group exercises over its stock price and the 
lack of control over an unrelated company’s stock price. Finally, if 
209 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983). 
210 See supra Section III.C. 
211 If there is no evidence that related parties are compensating employees using stock-based 
compensation at a greater rate than unrelated parties, then there is no evasion of income tax, and 
therefore enacting a similar rule would not have any reasonable basis. 
212 See supra Section III.A. 
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Treasury can demonstrate that controlled taxpayers have paid a lower 
percentage of total employee compensation as salary than uncontrolled 
taxpayers, they can show such a rule is necessary for the results of related 
party transactions to be consistent with the results unrelated parties would 
reach as required by the arm’s length standard.  
CONCLUSION 
In Altera Corp. v. Commissioner, the U.S. Tax Court invalidated a 
2003 Treasury regulation on APA grounds for failing to meet State Farm’s 
reasoned decisionmaking standard.213 The Tax Court’s decision marked the 
third consecutive failed attempt by the U.S. government to require foreign 
subsidiaries that are parties of “cost-sharing agreements” to reimburse a 
U.S. parent company for stock compensation expenses.214 This Note fills 
the gap left by the Altera decision and remedies Treasury’s repeated 
failures by providing an argument that would satisfy State Farm’s reasoned 
decisionmaking standard under the APA. This Note demonstrates that 
contrary to what other commentators have suggested,215 the existing 
definition of the arm’s length standard requires reference only to unrelated 
parties when the circumstances are sufficiently comparable. This Note 
further establishes the fact that unrelated parties have not shared these 
expenses in the past is irrelevant because there are fundamentally different 
levels of risks for unrelated and related parties in sharing stock 
compensation expense. Treasury can satisfy State Farm’s reasoned 
decisionmaking standard if Treasury can provide empirical evidence that 
unrelated parties use stock compensation at a greater rate than related 
parties. This evidence would satisfy State Farm’s reasoned decisionmaking 
standard because it would demonstrate the regulation is necessary to 
prevent taxpayers from evading income tax, and thus achieve the purpose 
of § 482. In sum, reviving this regulation closes one corporate tax loophole 
left by Altera, and allows the IRS to appropriately tax extremely profitable 
high-tech companies, such as Apple and Google, that engage in these types 
of cost-sharing agreements.216   
213 145 T.C. 91, 132 (2015), appeal docketed, No. 16-70497 (9th Cir. Feb. 23, 2016). All voting 
Tax Court judges signed on to the opinion and thus the Tax Court was unanimous. See Gupta, supra 
note 9, at 134. 
214 See Gupta, supra note 9, at 4. 
215 See id. at 2 (claiming the arm’s length standard is “statutorily enshrined,” although arm’s length 
is not mentioned in the statutory Internal Revenue Code). 
216 See supra Part I. 
